Although state-of-the-art PDF malware classifiers can be trained with almost perfect test accuracy (99%) and extremely low false positive rate (under 0.1%), it has been shown that even a simple adversary can evade them. A practically useful malware classifier must be robust against evasion attacks. However, achieving such robustness is an extremely challenging task.
Introduction
Machine learning classifiers have long been used for many important security problems such as malware detection, spam filtering, and online fraud detection. One of the most ubiquitous applications is to detect PDF malware, which is a very popular infection vector for both large-scale mass and targeted attacks. Many prior research projects have demonstrated that machine-learning-based PDF malware classifiers can achieve almost perfect test accuracy (99%) with extremely low false positive rate (under 0.1%) [43, 44] . Nonetheless, all the state-of-the-art classifiers, including the proprietary ones used by popular services like Gmail, can be evaded by trivial transformations over the PDFs, such as adding invisible document metadata, deleting the length indicator of the exploit payload, or simply increasing the length of the document [5, 32, 55] .
Since any security-relevant application of machine learning classifiers must deal with adaptive adversaries, it is fundamentally insufficient to evaluate security classifiers by measuring the accuracy and false positive rate. Despite the abundance of available metrics given by well-established theoretical results in machine learning [6] , none of them are suitable to measure the robustness of the classifiers under adaptive attackers. In order to be practically useful, a malware classifier must be demonstrated to be secure against different types of adaptive attacks. For example, a sample robustness property might require that no matter how many pages from benign documents are inserted into a PDF malware, the classifier still must classify the modified malware as malicious. Similarly, deletion of any non-functional objects in the PDF must not result in a benign classification.
Ideally, a classifier should be sound with regard to a robustness property. That is, the robustness property can be formally verified to get strict bounds on the worst-case behavior of the classifier. If a classifier satisfies the robustness property, the strongest possible attacker bounded by the specification of the property, i.e., bounded attacker, will not be able to violate the property, no matter how powerful the attacker is or whatever adaptive strategy she follows. For example, even for a perfect knowledge attacker, any creative way of inserting pages from the most-benign documents to the malware can be verified to keep the malicious classification.
Furthermore, the robustness properties should increase the computation cost for finding a successful evasion even for an attacker that is unbounded by these properties. Essentially, the attacker is solving a search problem to find an evasive PDF malware. She starts from a malicious PDF, performs a series of manipulations to the PDF, and eventually arrives at a solution that makes the PDF classified as benign without affecting its maliciousness. Unfortunately, without any robustness properties, the number of feasible manipulation paths for solving the search problem is large, which makes finding an evasion very easy in terms of computation effort. By training classifiers with verifiable robustness properties, we reduce the number of viable paths for the attacker, and thus increase the computation cost needed to succeed. Our vision is to eventually force the adversary to solve hard combinatorial optimization problems that incur significant computation cost by eliminating simple and easy evasions with verifiably robust training.
In this paper, we take the first steps towards training a PDF malware classifier with verifiable robustness properties, and we demonstrate that such classifiers also increase the attack cost even for the attackers not bounded by these properties. We address several challenges in building robust PDF malware classifiers. First, previous work has shown that retraining the malware classifier with adversarial instances drastically increases the false positive rates [1, 25] . Since verifiably robust training is strictly a harder problem to solve than adversarially robust training without any verifiable bound, it is challenging to specify robustness properties that do not increase false positive rates yet still increase the cost for the attackers. To this end, we propose a new distance metric for the structured PDF trees for our robustness properties that operate in the semantic space of PDF malware. Second, popular model choices for PDF malware classifiers are not suitable for robust training. For example, adversarially robust training over a random forest model requires manual adjustment to the complexity of trees to maintain acceptable accuracy [29] . Therefore, we choose a neural network model to leverage state-of-the-art verifiably robust training schemes. Third, to evaluate our defense, we use both existing feature-space gradient-based attacks as well as application-space attacks that generate actual evasive PDF malware. To this end, we develop an enhanced evolutionary attack and a new adaptive attack based on EvadeML [55] . We use these attacks to evaluate the increase in the unbounded attacker cost caused by the verifiable robust training.
Using our new distance metric for the PDF tree structure, we specify two classes of robustness properties, subtree deletion properties and subtree insertion properties. The properties allow any possible attacks involving deletion/insertion up to a bounded number of subtrees under the PDF root. For example, when choosing to delete /Root/Metadata subtree containing children /Root/Metadata/Length and /Root/Metadata/Type, the attacker can delete either one of the children, both children, or the whole subtree. Note that even at the subtree distance one, the properties include a large number of possible manipulated model inputs. For example, subtree insertion property bounds the attacker to any one of the 42 subtrees under the PDF root. Among them, /Root/Pages alone includes 2 1, 195 different input features for the classifier. To train different robustness properties, we apply verifiably robust training on five robust models, utilizing symbolic interval analysis [49, 50] . We measured the verified robust accuracy (VRA) for a test set of 3,416 PDF malware. The VRA represents the percentage of test samples that are verifiably robust against the strongest bounded attacker. Our models can obtain superior verifiable robustness against bounded attackers while keeping high test accuracies and low false positive rates.
Perhaps even more importantly, we show that a verifiably robust classifier with two proposed robustness properties can already increase the computation cost for the unbounded application-space attacker. We evaluated our model against two application-space (both adaptive and state-of-the-art) attackers (see threat model in Table 2 ): Within 10 hours, the state-of-the-art attacker's efficiency dropped from evading 185 PDF malware seeds on the non-robust model, to only 4 on the robust model, 46× increase in the computation cost. After succeeding in 4 PDF malware, the state-of-the-art unbounded attacker found no successful evasion on the robust classifier in 6 hours. For the adaptive attacker, we designed the adaptive strategy to spread out insertion and deletion manipulations into different subtrees of the PDF, as a straightforward workaround to the two robustness properties. However, within 10 hours, the adaptive attacker can only generate evasive variants for 46 PDF malware, which is 4× of the computation cost on a non-robust classifier. The results show that training verifiably robust PDF malware classifiers even for carefully chosen simple robustness properties can effectively reduce the set of viable paths for solving the evasion problem, increasing the computation cost significantly for an unbounded attacker.
As defenders, making all evasion attacks on malware classifiers computationally infeasible is an extremely hard problem. However, our work shows a very promising direction that increases the cost of an attacker by training malware classfiers that are verifiably robust against different simple robustness properties. The robustness properties proposed in this paper can be used as the building blocks for specifying more complex robustness properties, and further increase the robustness of PDF malware classifier. Our key contributions are summarized as follows.
• We are the first to evaluate and train verifiable robustness properties of PDF malware classifiers. We propose a new distance metric to bound the robustness properties in the PDF tree structure. We specify two essential robustness properties, as basic building blocks to compose more powerful properties.
• We train verifiably robust PDF malware classifier models. We thoroughly evaluate the robustness using state-of-the-art measures including estimated robust accuracy (ERA) under gradient attacks and verified robust accuracy (VRA) against any bounded adaptive attacker. We can achieve 99% VRA while maintaining 99.80% test accuracy and 0.41% false positive rate.
• We demonstrate that our verifiably robust model can increase the computation cost for both state-of-the-art unbounded attacker and a new adaptive unbounded attacker. The state-of-the-art unbounded attacker found no successful evasion on the robust classifier in 6 hours. Even for a new unbounded adaptive attacker, the number of successful evasions given a fixed time budget is cut down by 4×.
Background
In this section, we present an overview of the PDF format and how PDF malware works. Then, we introduce the features used by PDF malware classifiers and two main classes of attacks that evade them. At last, we introduce the two strongest robust training techniques to date, of which we adopt the verifiably robust training method to build our robust classifier.
PDF Malware
The Portable Document Format (PDF) contains four sections: header, body, cross-reference table, and trailer. The header identifies that the file is a PDF, the version of the standard followed by the file, and a magic number. The body of the PDF consists of various types of objects, with data structures including arrays, name trees, dictionaries, etc. For example, Figure 1a shows four PDF objects and the trailer from a PDF malware. The trailer identifies the root object as the entrance to parse the file, along with a size value related to the crossreference table. Here, the root object is 1 0 obj, where the object number is 1 and the version of the object is 0. R means referring to this object indirectly. The cross-reference table indexes the locations of all the objects in the file. Starting from the root object, a parser resolves other referred objects using the cross-reference table, which helps speed up the parsing process. However, even without the cross-reference table, a parser can scan the entire PDF to get the offsets of the objects.
The four main objects in this file are dictionaries, indicated by << and >> symbols and enclosed by obj and endobj keywords. The dictionary object is a collection of key/value pairs. Each key is a name object, and the value can be any object. The root object 1 0 obj has a special type, /Catalog, and the value of the key /OpenAction is another dictionary object. Within /OpenAction, the object containing the JavaScript exploit is referred to as 2 0 R. The exploit object contains a stream that can be decoded with the help of the /Filter indicator, and a length field for the stream. The exploit is executed when the file is opened. Many PDF readers do not need the correct length field to decode the stream, or do not need the length field at all. Malware authors can utilize this to delete the length field and evade the PDF malware classifier. The rest of the PDF contains two objects numbered 3 and 4 that refer to each other. The PDF structure forms a tree, by following the reference relationships among objects and taking the shortest path to every object. The tree structure of the example PDF malware is shown in Figure 1b. PDF malware exploits the vulnerabilities in the PDF reader in order to transfer execution control, e.g., to run shellcode and drop additional binary. One major type of PDF malware is JavaScript-based. For example, these PDFs can exploit vulnerable JavaScript APIs to do heap spray attack. Some PDF malware are not JavaScript-based, but they exploit other vulnerabilities in the PDF reader. For instance, the malware can embed Flash objects to exploit the ActionScript vulnerbaility in Flash, and some malware also exploit the TIFF vulnerability in the decompression process.
PDF malware authors employ various techniques to evade the detection. For example, they add content from legitimate documents, crash the PDF reader while running in the background, and obfuscate the PDF content. The malware authors can utilize different types of references in the PDF format to break down exploit payload into multiple objects, split the JavaScript code into multiple variables, and use encryption, etc. Detecting sophisticated obfuscation techniques is a standalone problem, which is not the focus in this paper. To date, simple evasion techniques are still very effective. One notable example is that increasing the length of the file to be 7,050,000 bytes can evade the Gmail PDF malware scanner [5] . Making PDF malware classifier robust against trivial manipulation remains a hard problem.
PDF Malware Classifiers
In this section, we discuss two open-source PDF malware classifiers that have attracted considerable evasion effort in the security community, PDFrate [43] and Hidost [44] . Both classifiers follow the general feature selection intuition, that is, a bag of weak features can constitute a strong classifier. Although many features used by the two classifiers are not malicious in nature, the different combinations of features show the differences between benign and malicious PDFs. They shed light on the feature design requirement for building a verifiably robust PDF malware classifier. We choose to use Hidost features directly, because they have interesting properties that can be utilized for verifiably robust training.
PDFrate
PDFrate [43] uses a lot of counts for keywords and certain fields in the PDF as features. In total, there are 202 features. Examples features include, number of characters in the author field, number of "endobj" keyword, sum of all pixels in all the images, and number of JavaScript markers, etc. The classifier is a Random Forest, with 99% accuracy and 0.2% false positive rate over the Contagio malware dataset [4] .
Since simple manipulation of the PDF file can result in very big changes in the feature values of PDFrate, these features cannot be easily bounded. For instance, inserting pages from a benign document to the PDF malware can increase the page count feature alone to be as big as the maximal integer value. If a bounded manipulation in the semantic of PDF cannot tightly bound the feature input to the classifier, these features are not suitable for verifiably robust training.
Hidost
Hidost [44] uses Bag-of-Path features extracted from the parsed tree structure of the PDF. It obtains the shortest structural path to each object, including terminals and non-terminals in the tree, and uses binary counts for these paths as features. In the paper, the authors used only those paths that appeared in at least 1,000 files in the corpus, which reduced the number of paths from 9 million to 6,087. Hidost was evaluated on a decision tree model and a SVM model. Both models have 99.8% accuracy and less than 0.06% false positive rate over 38K proprietary malicious PDF files from VirusTotal and 90K benign PDF files from Google searches.
The binary Bag-of-Path features are able to bound the input to the classifier, given certain attack properties. For example, in our dataset, if we insert anything under the /Pages subtree, only up to 1,195 features will be flipped from 0 to 1, resulting in a tight input bound to the classifier. Therefore, in this paper, we choose to use Hidost features to build our robust PDF malware classifier.
Automatically Evading Malware Classifiers
Several automated attacks have successfully evaded different malware classifiers. The sophistication of the attacks varies due to different underlying threat models.
White-box Attacks. White-box attackers are assumed to have perfect knowledge, including the model type, parameters, features and the training dataset. They can launch precise attacks targeting the exact model being trained, e.g., gradient-based attack [10, 32] . For instance, in the white-box setting, the Gradient Descent and Kernel Density Estimation (GD-KDE) attack can be launched against the SVM version of PDFrate [32] . Also, adversarial malware examples [25] can be crafted using the forward gradient method on a neural network trained to detect android malware [7] . The drawback of such white-box gradient-based attacks is that the evasion instances are found in the feature space, not in the semantic space of malware, so they do not generate actual PDF variants. In addition, [25] uses an approach to only add features, in order to preserve existing malicious functionality. We follow previous approaches to implement a gradient-based attack when evaluating the robustness of our PDF malware classifier.
Black-box Attacks. The threat models of black-box attacks generally assume that the attacker does not have access to any model parameters, but has oracle access to the prediction labels for some samples, and in some cases also the prediction confidence. In some settings, features and the model type are assumed to be known as well. Xu et al. [55] use a genetic evolution algorithm to automatically evade both PDFrate and Hidost with only black-box access to the classifiers. The evolutionary algorithm uses a fitness score as feedback, to guide the search in finding evasive PDF samples by mutating the seed PDF malware. For every generation of the population during the search, the attack uses a cuckoo oracle to dynamically check that mutated PDFs still preserve the malicious functionality when executed. This check is much stronger than static insertion-only methods used by gradient-based attacks. Dang et al. [15] uses a much more restricted threat model where the attacker does not have access to classification scores, and only has access to the classified label and a blackbox morpher that manipulates the PDFs. They use the scoring function based on Hill-Climbing to attack the classifier under such assumptions.
The limitation in the black-box setting is that signals from classification labels and scores are not as strong as white-box feedback such as gradients. Therefore, the search process needs to spend more effort exploring suboptimal regions before eventually succeeding at finding evasive PDF malware. In this paper, we improve upon the attack from the genetic evolution framework of EvadeML [55] , by generating more effective inputs and using a more diverse selection strategy to evade neural networks. We further implement an adaptive attack based on this framework.
Robust Training
Out of the arms race between image adversarial examples [45] and many defenses [8, 11, 12, 38, 39] , two training methods have proven to be the strongest among all. They are adversarially robust training and verifiably robust training. We briefly explain the concepts of them, and reason about why we choose to apply verifiably robust training to the PDF malware detection problem.
Robust Optimization
Both adversarially robust training and verifiably robust training are based on robust optimization. Let us first look at the regular optimization used by the training process of the neural network. Given an input x with the true label y, a neural network f θ parameterized by θ maps it to a labelŷ = f (x). A loss function L(y,ŷ) is used to evaluate the errors of such prediction, e.g., the cross-entropy loss. The training process has the following optimization objective that minimizes the loss to find optimal weights θ. The summation is an empirical measure of the expected loss over the entire training dataset.
In the adversarial setting, for the input x, there can be a set of all possible manipulationsx bounded by a distance metric D k within distance k, i.e.x ∈ D k (x). Robust optimization minimizes the worst case loss for all inputs in D k (x), solving a minimax problem with two components.
• Inner Maximization Problem: findx that maximizes the loss value within the robustness region D k (x), i.e., the robust loss.
• Outer Minimization Problem: minimize the maximal loss to update the weights θ of the neural network.
The following two robust training methods solve the inner maximization problem in different ways.
Adversarially Robust Training
Adversarially robust training empirically estimate the maximal loss in Equation 2 by using different attacks. The state-of-the-art adversarially robust training method from Madry et al. [35] uses adversarial examples found by the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [31] to estimate the robust loss for the training. The training method has been applied to benchmarking image datasets, including MNIST and CIFAR-10. The trained models have shown robustness against known attacks including the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [31] , Carlini-Wagner (CW) attacks [12] , Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [23] , etc.
Adversarially robust training has been applied to malware datasets, without distance-bounded robustness region. In the followup work to [55] , Xu et al. [1] applied adversarially robust training over the Contagio malware dataset, which increased the false positive rate to as high as 85%. Grosse et al. [25] applied the training method to the android malware classifier using adversarial malware examples, increasing the false positive rate to 67%.
Verifiably Robust Training
Verifiably robust training uses sound over-approximation techniques to obtain the upper bound of the inner maximization problem. Different methods have been used to formally verify the robustness of neural networks over input regions [17, 20, 21, 27, 30, 33, 40] , such as abstract transformations [22] , symbolic interval analysis [49, 50] , convex polytope approximation [52] , semidefinite programming [41] , mixed integer programming [46] , Lagrangian relaxation [19] and relaxation with Lipschitz constant [51] , which essentially solve the inner maximization problem. By using the worst case bounds derived by formal verification techniques, verifiably robust training [18, 37, 48, 53 ] can obtain such verified robustness properties.
The training method has been applied to image datasets to increase verifiable robustness, usually with the tradeoff of lower accuracy and higher computation and memory cost for the training. Recent work have focused on scaling the training method to larger networks and bigger datasets [48, 53] . Since verifiably robust training techniques can train classifiers to be sound with regard to the robustness properties, the trained network gains robustness against even unknown adaptive attacks. On the contrary, adversarially robust training is limited by the specific threat model used to generate adversarial instances for the training. Therefore, we apply verifiably robust training to build the PDF malware classifier. By carefully specifying useful robustness properties, our robust model has only 0.41% false positive rate.
ERA and VRA
In this paper, we will use the following two metrics to evaluate our verifiably robust PDF malware classifier. The metrics measure the adversarial robustness and the verifiable robustness of a trained model.
Estimated Robust Accuracy (ERA) measures the percentage of test inputs that are robust against known attacks, given a distance bound. For instance on the MNIST dataset, Madry et al.'s training method [35] 
Verifiably Robust PDF Malware Classifier
In this section, we describe the methodology to build a verifiably robust PDF malware classifier. Since any classifier used for security purposes has the adversarial nature, it is not sufficient to evaluate it with only accuracy and false positive rate. We need robustness properties for the classifier to understand its worst-case performance under attacks. The robustness properties should serve as additional evaluation for how users can trust a model. There are a few challenges for designing the robustness properties: [3] used for the regular training objective. The malicious PDFs include web exploits PDFs and email attachments for targeted attacks.
• The robustness properties should be composable. We propose properties regarding insertion and deletion operations that are the building blocks to manipulate any PDF structure.
• One can obtain sound analysis of the worst-case behavior of a classifier with regard to the robustness properties. In other words, a classifier satisfying the robustness properties is safe against the strongest possible bounded attacker. We utilize verifiably robust training to achieve this.
• The bounds set in the robustness properties should be in the semantic space of the malware. Existing distance metrics such as L p norm distances, though widely used in the pixel manipulation of images, are not meaningful to bound the basic operations for attackers to generate evasive malware that are parsable, functional, and similar to the original PDF. We propose a new distance metric for the PDF tree structure.
• Satisfying the robustness properties should increase the cost for attackers to evade the classifier. The attacker will need to spend more time to break the robust classifier in comparison to a non-robust one. We achieve this by specifying robustness properties that effectively reduce the feasible paths in the search space for the attackers. We experimentally measure the computation cost of the attacker.
Overview

Model Architecture
We choose a fully-connected neural network model to build a PDF malware classifier using Hidost features [44] . We follow previous work [25, 26, 42] to build a feed-forward neural network with two hidden layers, each with 200 neurons activated by ReLU, and a final layer of Softmax activation. The input features have 3,514 dimensions, representing all the distinct path features from the training dataset computed by the Hidost feature extractor [2] . We trained the model using the PDF malware dataset from Contagio [3] . We split the dataset into 70% train set and 30% test set, summarized in Table 1 . The malicious PDFs include web exploits PDFs and email attachments for targeted attacks. As baseline, we trained the network using the Adam Optimizer, with mini-batch size 50, 20 epochs, and learning rate 0.01. Our baseline model has 99.9% test accuracy and 0.07% false positive rate, which is consistent with the performance reported in PDFrate [43] and Hidost [44] (Section 2.2). The state-of-the-art verifiably robust training methods are developed for the neural network models. Although robust optimization procedure can be applied to train any model, the neural network model gives us the advantage to achieve both high test accuracy and high verified robust accuracy (VRA) (defined in Section 2.3.4), compared to other models commonly used by traditional malware classifiers such as support vector machine (SVM) and Random Forest.
Verifiably Robust Training
This section gives an overview of the verifiably robust training technique we use for the PDF malware classifier. Obtaining high accuracy and high VRA are two different objectives of training. Existing works on verifiably robust training for the image classification tasks have shown that training only for the robustness objective degrades regular test accuracy, and combining the two objectives helps smooth the conflict between the two [24, 37, 48] . Consequently, we adopt the same principle to train for a combined loss as below.
In Equation 3 , the left-hand side of the summation denotes the regular loss for the training data point (x, y), and the right-hand side represents the robust loss for any manipulated x bounded by a distance D k (x) satisfying a defined robustness property. We give the same weights to combine the two parts of the loss, which means that one epoch over the entire training dataset optimizes both the regular loss and the robust loss equally. In particular, for each robustness property within a specific distance k, the robust loss is computed by the worst case within bounded region of every training data input. More details about robust training can be found in Section 4.1. Next, we describe the specification of robustness properties for the training.
Robustness Properties
In this section, we specify robustness properties in the semantic space of PDF malware. We propose a new distance metric for PDF subtree, and two classes of subtree deletion and subtree insertion properties. More properties with larger distances can thus be easily constructed by combining these two types of properties. If a classifier satisfies the properties even at a small subtree manipulation distance from the malware seed, it can effectively reduce the set of feasible paths for the attacker to find evasive PDF malware.
Subtree Distance Metric
We propose a new distance metric, the subtree distance, to bound the attacker's mutations over a PDF malware. If the subtree distance between a PDF malware seed and its mutated variant is within k, it means that the manipulations are bounded within arbitrary k subtrees under the PDF root. We use the new distance metric to capture the similarity between a PDF malware seed and its mutated variant in the PDF tree structure, rather than in the feature space. Under a certain robustness property, The over-approximated set {x :x ∈ D k (x)} captures all PDF malwarex that can possibly be generated by mutations in arbitrary k subtree regions under the root of the malware seed x, regardless of the feature extraction method.
As an example, consider the case where the attacker chooses to insert under the /Root/Pages subtree. In our feature space, there are 1,195 distinct paths under /Root/Pages (e.g., /Root/Pages/Annots/Type, /Root/Pages/JavaScript/Length, etc.), and the attacker's operation may affect any one of the paths. In total, inserting under /Root/Pages may result in 2 1, 195 combinations of feature values, but they can all be bounded by the subtree distance one for /Root/Pages. In particular, if there was no /Root/Pages subtree in the original malware PDF, the 1,195 path features have a lower bound of all 0s and an upper bound of all 1s, as the region for the one subtree insertion distance bound with Hidost binary features.
The distance metric is in the semantic space of manipulating PDF files. If the attacker attempts to insert pages from benign PDFs, this operation will not exceed the bound of subtree distance one of /Root/Pages, no matter how long the malicious PDF document becomes. Moreover, the subtree distance one bounds the corresponding feature value range, as input to the classifier.
The distance metric is general across different attacks. We not only capture attacks that manipulate PDF objects, but also gradient-based attacks that directly change feature values. For any feature-space attack to generate actual PDFs after finding evasive feature vectors, the attacker needs to work in the PDF object space to write back a PDF file. This is very different from choosing distances for images. Since pixels of the images represent the features directly, using L p norm bounds as distance makes sense for images. However, for malware, we cannot escape the application semantic even if we start from the feature space.
Next, we describe two important robustness properties for any PDF malware. Since insertion and deletion are atomic operations of any PDF object manipulation, it is fundamental to formulate these properties at distance one before composing more complicated robustness properties.
Subtree Deletion Property
Robustness Specification: given a PDF malware, all possible manipulations to the PDF bounded by deleting an arbitrary subtree under the root, do not result in a benign prediction by the classifier.
For the PDF malware example shown in Figure 1b , this property allows deleting any one of the following: /Root/Type, /Root/Pages, and /Root/OpenAction. Note that this allows any combination of deletion under non-terminal nodes /Root/Pages and /Root/OpenAction. Without actually executing the manipulated PDFs after the deletion operation, some of them may lose malicious functionality. For instance, deleting /Root/OpenAction/JS removes the exploit; or deleting /Root/OpenAction/JS/Filter prevents the exploit from being decoded for execution. In general, some exploit triggers may be lost through manipulation, or the program semantic may be broken such that the malware cannot be properly executed by the PDF reader. The robustness property covers an over-approximated set of evasive malicious PDFs, and enforces that they are always classified as malicious. It is acceptable to include some non-malicious PDFs in the robustness region, as long as we do not increase the false positive rate for benign PDFs.
Subtree Insertion Property
Robustness Specification: given a PDF malware, all possible manipulations to the PDF bounded by inserting an arbitrary subtree under the root, do not result in a benign prediction by the classifier.
The number of total subtrees under the root in our feature space is 42. Therefore, this property allows inserting any one of the 42 subtrees under the PDF root, with all possible combinations within the subtree. In Figure 1b , our example PDF malware only has three subtrees under the root i.e., /Root/OpenAction, /Root/Pages, and /Root/Type. However, two of the subtrees are not full. In the input feature space, there are 560 children under /Root/OpenAction and 1,195 children under /Root/Pages. If the attacker chooses to insert more paths for either of the two subtrees, we allow 2 560 + 2 1, 195 total possible combinations of insertion operations, minus the number of paths that already exist in the original PDF malware. Similarly, among all the other subtree insertion choices, the attacker can first choose which subtree to insert under the root, then choose a specific configuration of the subtree for the insertion. Out of the 42 subtree choices, some are commonly seen in benign PDFs, e.g., /Root/Metadata, /Root/StructTreeRoot, /Root/ViewerPreferences, etc. Although the subtree distance for the property is only one, the total number of allowable possible insertions is on the order of the sum of exponentials for the number of children under each subtree, which is 2 1, 195 Table 2 : We evaluate our models using four types of attackers with different knowledge and access levels. They represent, (i) the strongest possible bounded attacker: the bounded adaptive attacker, (ii) two state-of-the-art unbounded attackers: the gradient attacker and the enhanced evolutionary attacker, and (iii) the new adaptive unbounded attacker: the adaptive evolutionary attacker. Only the bounded adaptive attacker is restricted by the robustness property.
Other Properties
We have introduced the subtree deletion and insertion properties with distance one to the original PDF malware. We do not explicitly specify other common properties like replacement, since each of them can be considered as a combination of deletions and insertions. In general, the robustness properties can be generalized to bound all possible attacks under N subtrees. Next, we describe two properties with distance 2 and distance 41.
Subtree Deletion Property (Distance 2): the strongest possible attackers bounded by deletions within any two subtrees under the root, cannot make the PDF classified as benign.
Subtree Insertion Property (Distance 41): the strongest possible attackers bounded by insertions within all but one subtrees under the root, cannot make the PDF classified as benign.
The subtree deletion property with distance 2 covers a larger set of attackers' actions than the property with distance one. For the subtree insertion property with distance 41, only one out of 42 subtrees are not allowed to manipulate for the property. Instead of choosing which subtree to insert under, the attacker chooses which one not to use, and everything else is allowed to be manipulated. With subtree distance 41, this makes the robustness region much larger, and potentially makes the malicious PDF look a lot more like benign. Different properties with different distances can be combined together to train a PDF malware classifier with stronger robustness guarantee. In our evaluation, we will demonstrate how to train multiple robustness properties using mixed training technique (Section 4.1).
Cost of Attack
The robustness properties can increase the cost of attacks, by reducing the set of feasible evasion paths when the attacker is solving the search problem of evasion. In particular, if a classifier satisfies the subtree deletion property bounded by distance one, the attacker will have to at least conduct multiple deletions from different subtrees to evade the classifier. The subtree insertion property is even stronger, since the good search space removed by the property is as large as the sum of exponentials for the sizes of 42 available subtrees. A property with a larger distance should further increase the attack cost, since the property removes more possible combinations that can evade the classifier. Our robustness properties can be composed together to further increase the attack cost. We will measure attacker's time cost to evade the robust model in Section 4, using both the state-of-the-art attack and a new adaptive attack.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the robustness properties in five models that are verifiably robust trained. We will first describe the experiment setup, then use four different types of attackers to evaluate the models. Our threat model is shown in Table 2 . We have four types of attackers:
(1) Strongest possible bounded attacker: bounded adaptive attacker.
(2) State-of-the-art unbounded attacker: gradient attacker.
(3) State-of-the-art unbounded attacker: enhanced evolutionary attacker.
(4) New adaptive unbounded attacker: adaptive evolutionary attacker.
Among them, only the first one, the bounded adaptive attacker is restricted by the specification of our robustness properties, whereas the rest are not. We will evaluate the strongest possible bounded attacker (the bounded adaptive attacker) by VRA, and the gradient attacker using ERA. For the state-of-the-art and new adaptive evolutionary attackers, we will experimentally measure the computation cost for the unbounded attacks.
Verifiably Robust Models
Machine. We used a desktop machine for all the experiments. The machine is configured with Intel Core i7-9700K 3.6 GHz 8-Core Processor, 64 GB physical memory, 1TB SSD, Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti GPU, and it runs a 64-bit Ubuntu Robust Training. We implemented verifiably robust training using Symbolic Interval Analysis [49, 50] as the sound over-approximation method to compute the robust loss (Equation 2, Section 2.3.1). In order to generate input intervals for the robustness properties, we need to parse and manipulate the PDFs. We have added stream type cross-reference table parsing on top of the modified version of pdfrw parser that handles malformed PDF malware [54] . Within the regular training dataset, we have successfully parsed 6,867 training and 3,416 testing PDF malware to train and evaluate the robustness properties. Table 3 shows the number of intervals we extracted for each property, separated by training and testing sets. For brevity, we will refer to the four robustness properties as property A (subtree deletion distance one), B (subtree insertion distance one), C (subtree deletion distance two) and D (subtree insertion distance 41). They are defined in Section 3.2.
We trained five robust models in total. For the first four models, each model has one of the four robustness properties. They correspond to model names Robust A, Robust B, Robust C and Robust D. For the last model, we trained both the subtree deletion property A and the subtree insertion property B, namely Robust A+B model.
We trained all models for 20 epochs, using the same set of hyperparameters as the baseline, as described in Section 3.1.1. In all training objectives, we optimize for both the regular loss and robust loss in each epoch, as defined in Equation 3. In particular, to train the Robust A+B model, we optimize for both robustness properties in the robust loss component during each training epoch, in order to obtain two properties in the same model.
The left side of Table 4 contains the test accuracy (Acc), false positive rate (FPR), and training time for the five robust models along with the baseline models. The accuracy and FPR are measured over the testing PDFs in Table 1 . The robust models with insertion properties (Robust B, Robust D, Robust A+B) took more than an hour to train, since they have significantly more intervals (Table 3 ) than deletion properties. On the contrary, Robust A and Robust C models can be both trained under 20 minutes. The average training time for each mini-batch is 0.036s. All the robust models, except the Robust D model, can maintain over 99% test accuracy while obtaining verifiable robustness. Robust D model dropped the test accuracy only a little to 98.41%. Training robustness properties increased the false positive rates by under 0.45% for Robust A, B, and A+B models, which are acceptable. For models C and D, the false positive rates increased to 2.15% and 3.6% respectively. The false positive rate increases more for the subtree insertion property (B) than the subtree deletion property (A) under the same subtree distance, and it increases more for a larger distance than a smaller distance for the same type of operation (C vs A, and D vs B). All the robust models have obtained verified robust accuracy, computed by the formal verification method based on interval analysis. We will discuss this in details in Section 4.2.
Next, we will describe the four types of attackers, our implementation of attacks, and the robustness evaluation.
Bounded Adaptive Attacker
Threat Model
Strongest Possible Bounded Attacker. First, we evaluate the robustness of our models against the strongest possible attacker bounded by the specification of the robustness properties. The bounded adaptive attacker has access to everything (detailed in Table 2 ), including model architecture and weights, knowledge about PDF features, the training algorithm and data, classification labels and scores, and she knows about the defense. The attacker can do anything within the bound, and conduct any manipulations to the PDF to evade the classifier. The only restriction in the threat model is that she performs attacks that are covered by the robustness properties.
Results
We evaluate the robustness against the bounded adaptive attacker using all the 3,461 testing malicious PDFs (Table 3) . We formally verify the robustness of the models with verified robust accuracy (VRA) metric, using symbolic interval analysis. For example, if the VRA is 99% for the one insertion property, it means that out of the 3,461 testing PDF malware, 99% of them will always be classified correctly as malicious, for all combinations of insertion attacks restricted by one of the subtrees under the PDF root. No matter how powerful the attacker is after knowing the defense, she will not have more than 1% success rate. Table 4 : The verified robust accuracy (VRA) computed from 3,461 testing PDF malware, for six models over four robustness properties. The name for the robust model corresponds to the property it is trained with. The Robust A+B model is trained with both subtree deletion property (A) and subtree insertion property (B) of distance one. The model has gained verifiable robustness for not only properties A and B, but also property C (subtree deletion at distance two). Table 4 shows all the VRAs for the baseline model and five verifiably robust trained models. The baseline model has some robustness against the deletion properties, with 52.08% VRA at distance one, and 4.22% VRA at distance two. For the robust models, we evaluate not only the robustness property that the model is trained with, but also other robustness properties. The model name corresponds to the property we trained it with. For instance, Robust A model is trained with property A. We summarize the key observations about the models as following.
Training a model with one robustness property can make it obtain the same type of property under a different distance. For example, for the deletion properties, Robust A model is trained with property A with subtree distance one, but it also achieved property C with distance two. On the other hand, Robust C model has both properties A and C. Similarly, for the insertion properties, training Robust D model with the subtree distance 41 makes it gain the property with distance one.
If we only train one type of property at a time, the other robustness properties may be lost. For example, Robust B and Robust D models both have decreased VRA in the deletion property, compared to the baseline model. This indicates the conflicts between training for different tasks in general. Similar results between training for normal test accuracy and verified robust accuracy have been shown in related work. Therefore, in order to gain different types of robustness properties together, we trained Robust A+B model using a mixed training approach as describe in Section 4.1. We optimize for regular accuracy, property A, and property B altogether during each training epoch.
The tradeoff of training a robustness property with larger distance is the increase in false positive rate. Therefore, it is not the best option to simply increase the distance in the property in order to gain stronger robustness, especially due to the Base-Rate Fallacy for any security classifier [9] . Combining several robustness properties with small distances can be a better choice to build a model that is even stronger than our robust A+B, while maintaining low false positive rate.
Gradient Attacker 4.3.1 Threat Model
State-of-the-art Unbounded Attacker. The gradient attacker is the white-box attacker in our evaluation settings. She has knowledge and access to everything, and she is not bounded by the robustness properties. Having access to the model weights gives the attacker a very strong advantage in using gradient descent to evade the PDF malware classifiers. The limitation of the attacker is that she only performs insertion in the feature space, working under the assumption that insertion will not lose the maliciousness of PDF, but arbitrary deletion might [25, 28] .
Implementation
We follow Grosse et al.'s method [25] to implement an insertion-only gradient-based attack against neural network. Each iteration of the attack takes the gradient of the benign label with regard to the input feature extracted from the PDF malware, and chooses the input index with the highest gradient value, then flips that value from zero to one in the input feature space. We repeat this for several iterations until either an evasion instance is found in the feature space or the preset iteration threshold is reached. Unlike other gradient-based attacks against image classifiers, we do not restrict the L p norm distance during any iteration.
Results
We show that our verifiably robust models can improve the estimated robust accuracy (ERA) against the gradient attacker. We ran our gradient-based insertion-only attack using the entire set of 3,416 testing PDF malware (Table 3) as attack starting points. We tested the robustness of all models against the attack over 30 attack iterations. The result is consistent with the VRA shown in Table 4 . Model D has 99.88% VRA for the subtree insertion property with distance 41, which is formally verified. The second robust model against the attack is Robust B, trained with subtree insertion property of distance one. At 10th iteration, the Robust B model maintained 95.52% ERA, in comparison with the 1.28% ERA from the baseline model. The baseline model is more robust against this attack than Robust A and Robust C. Since we only trained the deletion property in these models, Robust A and Robust C lost some robustness against insertion attack. However, if we only use Robust D model, an adaptive attacker can simply try deletion attack. Therefore, it is important to train both deletion and insertion properties. Robust A+B model can balance the robustness between insertion and deletion, while still outperforms the baseline against the gradient attack.
Note that all the ERA numbers are the lower bound of the models' accuracy against the gradient attacker, since the attack works in the feature space, not the PDF application semantic space. Among the adversarial instances we generated using the attack, some of them may not correspond to real functional PDF malware. In reality, attackers can also perform feature deletion and preserve maliciousness. However, it is unknown how a gradient attacker can co-ordinate multiple insertion and deletion operations while generating real evasive PDF malware can be parsed and stays functional.
Enhanced Evolutionary Attacker 4.4.1 Threat Model
State-of-the-art Unbounded Attacker. The enhanced evolutionary attacker has black-box oracle access to the model, including the classification label and scores. The attacker knows how features are extracted from the PDFs, and the model architecture. The attacker does not know about the defense, but the operations she can perform is not bounded by the robustness properties. The attack is based on the genetic evolution algorithm [55] .
Implementation
The genetic evolution attack is essentially fuzzing the model prediction function by mutating the PDF malware seed, using random deletion, insertion, and replacement. Insertion and replacement use external genomes (subtrees) from benign PDFs. The search guidance is a fitness function based on classification score that indicates the progress towards flipping the classifier's decision. Knowing the model architecture, the attacker can effectively construct a fitness function tailored for the neural network. So we get the classification scores for malicious and benign classes, and use log (benign) − log (malicious) as the fitness function. When the fitness score reaches zero, the attack succeeds. During the search, whenever the PDF variant loses maliciousness according to a cuckoo oracle, the selection strategy replaces the bad variants with either the original seed, the best seed from the last generation, or the best historical seed. Good variants are kept over different generations of population to continue the mutation, until the classifier predicts any variant as benign.
We ran the original evolutionary attack from EvadeML [55] but it failed to evade the regularly trained model. We implemented two strategies to enhance the evolutionary attack.
First, we improved the effectiveness of insertion and replacement operations. We found out that the insertion and replacement operations used by EvadeML generate a lot of different PDF malware, but not as many different feature inputs to the neural network, because they don't generate valid Hidost paths that already exist in the feature space. Therefore, we use a trie to look up genomes from benign PDFs that share the same prefix as the selected insertion/replacement point, to make insertion and replacement operations effectively change the input features to the neural network.
Second, we implemented a more diverse selection strategy for every generation of the PDF variants. Diversity is crucial to avoid the evolutionary algorithm being stuck at premature convergence that does not break the classifier. We keep all the PDF malware variants that survived from the previous generation, as in the original implementation. However, for those variants that lost maliciousness, we need to find replacement for them to fill up the next generation. We separate the choices by three shares. The first share selects the best historical seed. The second share selects the historical variants with distinct highest fitness scores, since distinct scores show that the variants explored different mutation paths in the search space. The last share randomly selects from a pool of historical variants from the last four generations as well as the original seed, since randomness helps the search process explore more diverse paths that could lead to the solution. Table 5 : Number of evasive PDF malware generated by the state-of-the-art and adaptive evolutionary attackers on the baseline model and Robust A+B model, within 10 hours. Robust A+B model has two verifiable robustness properties: subtree insertion and subtree deletion properties at distance one.
After implementing the two strategies, we can successfully break the baseline neural network model with an average of 3 minutes per seed.
Results
We compare the computation cost for the enhanced evolutionary attacker to evade the Robust A+B model against the baseline model. Following Xu et al. [55] , we use the same parameters for the attack: 48 variants as the size of the population for each generation, a maximum of 20 generations for each round, 0.0 fitness stop threshold, and 0.1 mutation rate. Also, we select four PDFs with most benign classification scores, and provide these as the external benign genome for the attacker. The external genomes contain a total of 42,629 PDF objects. We use 500 PDF malware with network behavior detected by the cuckoo sandbox [55] within the test set as seeds. We randomly schedule the sequence of seeds for the evasion task. We separate the malware seeds by batches of 10. For each 10 PDF malware, we run 3 rounds of attacks, then we move on to the next round. Attacks in the later rounds and later batches have advantage in reusing promising traces from previous results.
We set a 10 hours threshold for the attacker to evade each model. On the baseline model, the attacker generated evasive variants for 185 PDF malware seeds. Then, we reused the same parameters, same random start state for each PDF malware seed, same attack scheduling, and ran the attack against the Robust A+B model. Within the same amount of time, the attack can only succeed on 4 PDF malware. After 4 PDFs, the attack found no successful evasion on the robust classifier in 6 hours. The attack computation has been slowed down by 46× times. This shows that verifiably robust training can effectively reduce the feasible paths in the search space, which makes the evasion search problem harder to solve for the enhanced evolutionary attacker. The evolutionary algorithm already provides the advantage of utilizing a population of variants to explore different paths at the same time, but we can increase the attack time cost by 46× slowdown by training with two simple robustness properties. New Adaptive Unbounded Attacker. The adaptive evolutionary attacker has the same level of black-box access as the previous enhanced evolutionary attacker. She is not bounded to perform operations specified by the robustness properties. However, she has one more advantage. That is, she knows about the defense, so she can launch a stronger adaptive attack. Utilizing knowledge about the robustness properties for the Robust A+B model, the adversary knows that we are verifiably robust against attacks bounded by subtree insertion and deletion at distance one. Evidently, a straightforward way to evade the two robustness properties is to insert and delete more objects under different subtrees.
Implementation
The strategy of the adaptive evolutionary attacker is to spread out the insertion and deletion under different subtrees. Therefore, we keep track of past insertion and deletion operations separately, and perform new insertion and deletion operations to target a different subtree. Note that the mutation history is maintained separately for insertion and deletion, e.g., if the attacker has tried deletion under a subtree, she is going to try deletion under other subtrees first, but she can still try insertion there. We implemented the adaptive evolutionary attack on top of the enhanced evolutionary attack describe in Section 4.4.
Results
We measure the attack time to evade the verifiably robust trained model Robust A+B. As before, we reused the same parameters, same start states, same attack scheduling, and ran the adaptive attack over the robust model. Within the 10 hours threshold, the adaptive attacker generated evasive variants for 46 PDF malware seeds, 11.5 times of that by the state-of-the-art attacker. The results show that the adaptive attack is stronger than the state-of-the-art one, but the search process is still slowed down by a factor of 4× on the Robust A+B model, compared to 185 PDF malware evaded on the baseline model. Table 5 summarizes our overall measurement results in attack time cost. By analyzing successful evasion solutions to the baseline model and the robust model, we can see that on average, evading the robust model requires a longer mutation path, and manipulations under more subtrees. Figure 3 plots the distribution for number of mutations and number of subtrees found in distinct evasion solutions against the two models. 80% of attack solutions against the baseline model have only performed one or two mutations under at most two different subtrees. However, the attacker needs to insert/delete an average of 17 times, spreading across 11 different subtrees to evade the robust model.
When attacking the robust model, the classification scores often give the wrong direction. Without utilizing the knowledge about defense, the previous state-of-the-art attacker has to resort more to luck, instead of guidance from the fitness function. Using knowledge about the defense, the adaptive attacker can more steadily increase the fitness scores, making progress much sooner than the state-of-the-art one. Utilizing verifiably robust training, we force the attacker to use knowledge about the robustness properties instead of blindly trusting the attack progress indication given by the model. Our results show that training verifiable robustness properties for the classifier is a promising way to force the attacker to solve a harder search problem.
Discussion
Generalization. In the arms race against malware detection and evasion, there has been no verifiably robust solution to the detection problem. Without setting any bounds for the attacker, verifying the robustness of a malware classifier is an extremely hard problem. By setting certain bounds on attackers' actions, we can provide verifiable robustness properties in PDF malware classifiers. We further experimentally show that such robust training can also increase the computation cost for other state-of-the-art unbounded attackers. Since our robustness properties are specified in the application semantic space of PDF, they can be generalized to different features, datasets, and models. Our method to train verifiable robustness properties can be complementary to other defense methods such as feature reduction. We plan to explore all these issues regarding the generalization of our methodology to other types of machine learning models in our future work.
Diverse Robustness Properties. The two basic robustness properties for insertion and deletion can be used as building blocks to construct stronger robustness properties. For example, we can train a model with different combinations of subtree insertions and deletions. Verifiably robust training against such properties will help make the evasion task even harder for the attacker as she will need to find some specific combination of mutation operations. However, such properties might also increase the computational cost of verifiably robust training. Exploration of such trade-offs will be an interesting direction for future work.
Related Work
Existing defenses in increasing the robustness of malware classifiers mainly focus on using feature reduction and adversarially robust retraining. Researchers have employed methods including mutual information [25] , expert domain knowlege [28] , information from cuckoo sandbox [47] to remove features unrelated to maliciousness. However, previous adversarial retraining results show severe drop in accuracy [28] , and increase in false positive rate [1, 25] .
Among the defenses, Incer et al. [28] enforced the monotonicity property to make the malware classifier robust against attacks that increase feature values. Thus, attackers have to conduct more expensive feature manipulation that might remove the malicious functionality. In comparison, we train robustness properties not only for insertion, but also for deletion, since deletion operations are often not costly to the attacker [55] . Also, we formally verify the trained robustness properties, while maintaining 99.80% test accuracy and 0.41% false positive rate.
Our method increases the computation cost for the attacker to evade the model. Existing work have mainly discussed cost for the attackers to manipulate features. Lowd and Meek [34] proposed the cost as weighted sum of changes between the feature values. On graph structured data, Chen et al. [13] measured the cost for the attacker to manipulate nodes and edges as increased suspiciousness and decreased malicious agility. Dai et al. [14] formulate adversary's goal as a combinatorial optimization problem under constraints. They analyzed the time complexity of different attack strategies as attack cost. In comparison, we measure the empirical computation cost for the attacker to solve the combinatorial optimization problem, without the small-neighborhood modification constraints.
On the other hand, several work have explored the cost for the defender [16, 56] . Since certain misclassification causes more harm than others, it is more dangerous to misclassify malware as benign than the reverse [36] . In addition, Dreossi et al. [16] argue that only some adversarial examples cause the overall control system to make catastrophic decision. Zhang et al. [56] integrated a cost matrix with Wong et al.'s verifiably robust training method [52] to factor in the defender's cost when training a robust classifier.
Conclusion
We are the first to train verifiable robustness properties for PDF malware classifier. We propose a new distance metric in the application semantic space of PDF to bound robustness properties. Our robustness properties can be used to compose stronger properties. Our best model achieved 97.75% and 99.09% verified robust accuracy (VRA) for the insertion and deletion properties, while maintaining 99.80% accuracy and 0.41% false positive rate. A classifier with two simple robustness properties can increase the computation cost for even an adaptive attacker to evade it, by 4× slowdown. Our results show that training security classifiers with verifiable robustness properties is a promising direction to increase the computation cost for attackers.
